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The Impacts on the U.S.  Grapefruit Industry from Banning
the Pesticide  Sodium Ortho-Phenylphenate
Jean C. Buzby  and Thomas H. Spreen
Sodium ortho-phenylphenate  (SOPP) is a postharvest pesticide commonly used on citrus.
SOPP poses some food safety risks and is currently in the Environmental Protection
Agency's  Stage IV of the pesticide re-registration  process.  Costs to the fresh grapefruit
industry are estimated for increases in the postharvest  loss rates of fresh grapefruit fol-
lowing an SOPP ban.  The ban's effects  on domestic and export sales of fresh and proc-
essed grapefruit are estimated.
In the agricultural  policy arena,  pesticide is-  packinghouses were treated with SOPP (Love and
sues are a top food safety concern.  Currently, the  Buzby).  However,  SOPP  has  been  found  car-
Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  is  in-  cinogenic  and  oncogenic  in  laboratory  animals
volved  with  the  mandatory  re-registration  pro-  and  promotes  benign  and  cancerous  tumors
gram  of all registered  pesticides.  This  compre-  (Hiraga and Fujii, Fukushima and  others).  SOPP
hensive  re-registration  of  pesticides  will  likely  is  currently  in  Phase  IV  of  the  EPA's  re-
cause  the cancellation,  suspension,  and voluntary  registration  program  which  means  that  all  past
withdrawal of some agricultural  pesticides.  This  chronic toxicology studies are being reviewed and
process  uses modern  standards  to protect human  additional  research needs are being identified and
health  and the environment  while preserving  the  requested.
public's  confidence  in  the  food  supply  (EPA  In this study, the Florida grapefruit  industry
1991).  When  reviewing  a  pesticide,  the EPA's  is used as a proxy for the U.S. grapefruit industry.
policy agenda  and accounting  of costs  and bene-  Florida grapefruit production  is reasonable proxy
fits  of reducing  a  selected  pesticide  involves  a  of U.S. grapefruit production because in  1990-91,
heavy  emphasis  on the biological  effects  on hu-  Florida produced  85  percent of total  U.S.  output
man health; the main focus is toxicity.  of grapefruit (Fl.  Ag.  Stat.  Serv.).  Also Florida
This  study focuses  on estimating the cost of  produces the dominant share (99+%) of all grape-
increases  in  postharvest  losses  of grapefruit  re-  fruit exports.  In the  1992-93  season,  17.2 million
suiting  from  a  ban  of the  postharvest  pesticide,  cartons  of  grapefruit  were  exported  out  of the
sodium 6rtho-phenylphenate  (SOPP),  from use  in  U.S. and all but 9 thousand of these cartons were
grapefruit  packinghouses.  On  citrus,  SOPP  has  produced in Florida (Fl. Ag. Stat. Serv.).
been  used  extensively  in  controlling  postharvest  In general,  if an important  postharvest pesti-
diseases  for over  25 years (Eckert  and Ogawa,  p.  cide is banned from use on fresh grapefruit, in the
431) and is used exclusively  in postharvest  stages.  short  run  there would  potentially  be  three  main
SOPP  is  considered  essential  to  postharvest  re-  costs to the grapefruit  industry.  The three  indus-
gimes  for citrus  (Lindsey  and  others,  p.  27).  A  try  costs  are:  (1)  new  fixed  costs  for  packing-
United  States Department of Agriculture  (USDA)  houses to switch to an alternative  technology,  (2)
1992  survey  of  103  Florida  grapefruit  packing-  higher  variable  costs  for  more  expensive  pesti-
houses  revealed  that  in  the  1990-91  season,  51  cides, and (3)  lost producer surplus because of in-
percent  of  all  fresh  grapefruit  received  by  the  creased  postharvest  losses  (following  increased
pathogen resistance).
The  authors  are  Agricultural  Economist,  Department  of  New fixed costs might  include costs  of pur-
Agricultural  Economics,  University of Kentucky,  and Profes-  chasing  equipment to  apply  a new non-chemical
sor, Department  of Food and  Resource Economics,  Univer-
sity of Florida.  Views expressed are those of the authors and
do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  views  of the  University  of  Cappellini and  Ceponis define postharvest  losses as the dif-
Kentucky and the University of Florida.  The authors wish to  ference between  the product  harvested and  the product  con-
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technology  (e.g.,  cold treatments)  or to apply al-  of consumer surplus.  Although,  it would be theo-
ternative  pesticides.  Yet,  often  different  pesti-  retically  sound to include the costs of the regula-
cides can use the same equipment, i.e., fixed costs  tory  action  and  enforcement  in  a  cost  benefit
may not change  if the replacement pesticide  uses  analysis  of the pesticide  ban,  to date, there  have
the  same  application  technology  as  the  banned  not been  any bans of postharvest pesticides  used
pesticide.  Irradiation is not a feasible technology  on fresh grapefruit for use as a proxy.4 The EPA's
for citrus fruits because doses high enough to kill  Freedom  of Information  Office can  provide  cost
pathogens are damaging to the fruit.  figures  for  regulatory  actions  when  given  the
Whether total variable  costs increase  follow-  names of banned pesticides.
ing a pesticide ban depends  on which pesticide  is  An  SOPP ban will not  only affect  the shelf
banned  and  on  the  annual  variable  costs  of the  life  of grapefruit  sold  domestically  but will  also
replacement  technology.  For profit maximizing  affect  exports.  U.S.  grapefruit  producers  rely
grapefruit  packinghouses,  the  ban  will  lead  to  heavily on export demand.  Forty percent of fresh
higher variable costs of more  expensive pesticides  U.S. grapefruit was exported for the 1991-92 crop
until they have access to alternatives that are less  year while imports were insignificant (Econ. Res.
expensive  and are  equally  effective.  The  differ-  Serv.,  p. 37).  Japan  is the main  importer of U.S.
ence  in  variable  costs  between  using  a  banned  fresh grapefruit.  Other  important  destinations  in-
pesticide and its alternative  may be small relative  elude France,  Canada,  and Great  Britain.  Grape-
to the other costs of the ban.2 fruit exports to more  distant grapefruit  importing
Beyond  the  typical  fixed  and  variable  cost  countries  will  be  especially  affected  because  of
increases resulting from a ban of a major posthar-  the  increased  difficulty  of  maintaining  quality
vest  pesticide,  postharvest  losses  would  most  during transit.
likely  increase  due  to  the  build-up  of pathogen
resistance.  Kader and Arpaia  state that for citrus  Previous Literature
fruits,  pathogen  resistance  to  fungicides  can
quickly  develop  and  this  resistance  limits  the  Babcock  states  that  there  is  a hierarchy  of
postharvest  life of the fruit.  Grapefruit  packing-  cost  estimation  methods  with  different  levels  of
houses currently have a limited selection of post-  time  and  data  requirements  that  yield  different
harvest pesticides  available  for use  and  often  ro-  levels of accuracy  and applicability.  Selection  of
tate  pesticides  to  deter  pathogen  resistance.3 a cost estimation method hinges on the purpose of
Banning  an  important  postharvest  pesticide  like  the study  and  on resource  availability.  Methods
SOPP would mean that there are fewer pesticides  range  from  simplistic  extrapolations  of existing
to rotate.  cost data to definitive  cost estimates that are time-
A ban  of an  important  postharvest  pesticide  consuming,  detailed,  and  expensive  (Babcock).
for grapefruit would not only affect the grapefruit  The most basic  cost  estimation  method  is an  ex-
industry,  but would also impose costs to society:  trapolation of existing cost data to the appropriate
(1) regulatory/enforcement  costs,  and (2)  the loss  level.  Babcock  identifies  some  of the more  ad-
vanced  cost  estimation  approaches  as  combined
2  For  example,  in Augustmulti-variable  regressions, discrete multi-variable For  example,  in  August,  1992,  Tom  Tsun  of  FMC
Corporation  provided  variable  cost  estimates  for  treating  regressions,  and  the conceptual  factoring  of dis-
grapefruit  with  SOPP  and  an  alternative  pesticide,  TBZ.  crete equipment.
When the higher variable  costs are  applied to the number of  Buzby  performed  a  formal  cost-benefit
fresh Florida grapefruit treated  with SOPP and not with TBZ  analysis  of  an  SOPP  ban  from  use  on  Florida
in  the  1991-92  season,  annual  variable  costs  increase  by  gt  dd  fh  m  . .r-,nnn£  ii .r,  •.,  i_-  • J  TT  - ,-•  grapefruit designated for fresh markets.  The cost- $7,000 for all of Florida's grapefruit industry.  Hence in thisit 
case,  variable costs would be a relatively minor cost if SOPP  benefit  analysis  considered  the  previously  men-
was banned and TBZ was the alternative technology.  tioned  costs  to  the  U.S.  grapefruit  industry  and
found that the cost of postharvest losses would be
3The  major  postharvest pathogens  affecting  grapefruit  are
the  stem-end  rots  and  wound  pathogens  such  as  blue  and
green molds  (Wardowski  and Brown, Eckert  and  Ogawa, p.  4 Yet,  some post-harvest  pesticides  used  on  grapefruit  have
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the main  cost affecting  grapefruit  packinghouses  (1)  to determine the sensitivity of the cost of
if  SOPP  is  banned,  assuming  a  10  percent  in-  postharvest  losses  to  the  grapefruit  industry  to
crease in postharvest  losses.  Benefits were quan-  two, five, and ten percent increases in postharvest
tified  using  a  contingent  valuation  survey  that  loss rates following an SOPP ban,
elicited  consumers'  willingness  to pay for grape-
fruit that was not treated with  SOPP (i.e.,  a food  (2)  to determine the effect of the postharvest
safety  risk reduction).  Under this  scenario,  the  losses  on domestic and  export sales  of fresh  and
benefits of the ban outweighed costs.  processed  grapefruit  resulting  from  the  different
However,  the  actual  loss  rate  following  an  levels of postharvest losses.
SOPP ban  is not known  because  SOPP  has  been
used  continuously  on  citrus  in the United  States  Theoretical Foundation
since  its development.  The extent of the  increase
in  postharvest  grapefruit  losses  would  depend  Theoretically,  the  net  national  benefits  (or
upon  the  efficacy  of the  remaining  registered  costs) for all relevant markets  are found  via con-
pesticides  in killing target pests and in combating  sumer  surplus  (CS)  and  producer  surplus  (PS).
the  build-up  of pathogen  resistance.  Comments  Changes in CS  and PS are estimated to provide  a
of  grapefruit  packinghouse  operators  were  re-  net welfare measure.  The underlying rationale for
corded  during  the  pretesting  of USDA's  1992  estimating a monetary measure of the costs of an
postharvest  handlers  survey.  These  comments  SOPP ban  is to provide a check on the economic
indicated that if SOPP was banned, packinghouse  rationality of the policy change.
operators  would  be  concerned  about  increased  An SOPP  ban would  affect both consumers'
pathogen  resistance  and  postharvest  losses  be-  and  producers'  surplus.  Because  use  of a post-
cause they felt that there were no good substitutes  harvest grapefruit pesticide extends  shelf life and
for  SOPP.  As  an  approximation  for  loss  rates  reduces losses due to spoilage, a ban would result
following an SOPP ban, estimated losses with and  in a leftward (upward) shift of the supply function
without  other pesticides  can be  used  as a proxy.  for fresh grapefruit as depicted  in Figure  1.  The
For example, in the early  1980's, a study in Cali-  supply  function  would  shift  from  SS1  to  SS2.
fornia  estimated  that adding  the postharvest  pes-  Prior to implementation of the ban, CS is depicted
ticide,  Imazalil,  to  the  list  of permissible  pesti-  as the  area pda while  CS after  the ban  is  repre-
cides  for use  in packinghouses  could  potentially  sented by p'db.  The decrease in CS is defined by
decrease fresh grapefruit losses up to five percent.
The assumption  of a 10  percent  loss rate  was se-  Figure 1. Consumer Surplus and Producer
lected as a reasonable high-end estimate.  Surplus Changes Following  an Increase in
Postharvest Losses.
Objectives
The  current  report  extends  the  work  by  price
Buzby and contributes to the literature by reveal-  d  SS2
ing  the  importance  of postharvest  losses  to the
U.S.  grapefruit  industry and the sensitivity of the
increased  cost  to  various  levels  of postharvest  b
losses.  This report also extends Buzby's  study in  p'  .............  SS
that  it  includes  domestic  and  export  markets  for  p  ..
processed  grapefruit.  Although this study focuses
on  the  cost  of postharvest  losses  following  an  f
SOPP ban,  the  results  are  not  specific  to  SOPP.
The results can represent the cost of any pesticide  e  \  demand
ban that has the loss rates used here.  Specifically,
this report has two objectives:  Q'  Q  quantity42  September 1995  Journal  of  Food  Distribution  Research
the area pp'ba.  Similarly, PS before the ban is the  In  particular,  Pana  developed  a  spatial  equilib-
area pae, and PS after the ban is the area p'bf. The  rium  model  for  the  Florida  grapefruit  industry.
change  in  PS  may  be  positive  or  negative,  de-  The  model  maximizes  the  sum  of producer  and
pending  upon  the  elasticity  of the  demand  and  consumer  surpluses  subject  to  a  demand  and
supply curves,  the time horizon,  and  the  magni-  supply balance.
tude of the supply shift.  Pana  augmented  the  standard  spatial  equi-
Whether  costs  rise  for  individual  packing-  librium  model  with  a  cohort  population  model.
houses depends  on if the firm was using  SOPP at  Essentially,  the  cohort  model  calculates  annual
the time of the ban and on the adaptability  of the  grapefruit production by multiplying the stock of
existing capital equipment to incorporate the new  trees for each age group  by each  age group's  av-
substitute postharvest technology.  Packinghouses  erage yield per tree  and then sums the  production
currently  not using  SOPP  do  not  face  costs  of  in  each category.  Once  total  grapefruit  produc-
switching  to  alternative  technology  and  may  tion  is determined,  the spatial  equilibrium  model
benefit from the ban if retail prices for grapefruit  allocates  grapefruit  among  fresh  and  processed
increase  or if farm-level  prices for grapefruit  de-  demands  in  both  domestic  and  foreign  markets.
crease. Though, non-users  of SOPP may be nega-  The model has  several features that are important
tively affected if farm-level prices increase,  in understanding  the results:  (1)  grapefruit supply
originates  in  Florida;  (2)  each  season,  supply  is
Estimation of the Cost of Postharvest Losses  determined  by the  age  distribution  of trees,  sur-
vival rates,  and yields  by age  class;  (3)  there  are
Data  from  the  1992  postharvest  handlers  six markets:  fresh white domestic,  fresh pink do-
survey of Florida grapefruit packinghouses  (Love  mestic,  fresh  white  exports,  fresh  pink  exports,
and  Buzby)  and  data  from  a  grapefruit  model  processed  exports,  and  domestic  processed;  (4)
(Pana)  were  used  to  evaluate  the  costs  of in-  the  model  allocates  Florida's  annual  grapefruit
creased  postharvest  losses  due  to  an  SOPP  ban  production  among  these  six markets  and  obtains
from use on fresh Florida grapefruit.  The survey  market  clearing  prices  for each  market and  time
found  that  SOPP  was  widely  used  and  that  if  period  and;  (5)  there  is  no  substitution  between
SOPP  was  banned,  29 out of the  40  SOPP  users  white and pink grapefruit  in the fresh market,  and
surveyed would switch to or rely more heavily on  both are equally suitable for processing.5
alternative  pesticides  such  as  thiabendazole  The  model  provides  wholesale  level  prices
(TBZ), chlorine,  imazalil,  and assorted detergents  and  quantities  for the six markets as well  as  on-
(Buzby, p. 41).  Therefore,  the scenario assumed  tree  prices  and  quantities  for  white  and  pink
in  this  study  is  that  grapefruit  packinghouses  grapefruit.  Marketing  margins  can  be calculated
switch  to  alternative  pesticides  following  an  using  the  on-tree  and  wholesale  prices  from  a
SOPP ban.  Switching to another pesticide seems  baseline scenario and an alternative  scenario.
rational  because  non-chemical  technologies  used  The  model was modified to provide  data for
without  fungicides  are  not  as  economical  or  ef-  this  study.  The model was  adjusted to reflect  in-
fective  in  prolonging  grapefruit  storage  life  as  creases  in postharvest  losses to the grapefruit  in-
when  combined  with  pesticides.  For  example,  dustry  following  an  SOPP  ban.  In  order to  sell
grapefruit are chill  sensitive which means that the  the same quantity of fresh grapefruit, more grape-
use of refrigeration  and other cold treatments  are  fruit was packed to reflect the loss.  In the model,
limited (Hardenburg et al.).  total  quantities  of  both  pink  and  white  fresh
This  study  uses  a  mathematical  program-  grapefruit  faced  the  same  loss  rates  because  a
ming model  developed  by Pana to project  grape-  change  in fungicide  regime would affect both va-
fruit  production  levels  and  prices  following  an  rieties similarly.
SOPP ban.  The study  does not sum  all the costs
and benefits of the ban  but rather focuses  on one
crucial  aspect,  postharvest  losses.  The  mathe-  The  validity  of this  assumption  is  questionable.  White
matical  programming  model  developed  by  Pana  grapefruit  is  generally  preferred  for  processing;  there  has
been expanded use of pink grapefruit for processing  in recent
was used to project production  levels and prices.  years as the production of pink grapefruit has grown.Buzby and  Spreen  Impacts on U.S. Grapefruit  Industryfrom Pesticide  Banning  43
A one year time  horizon  was  used to deter-  kets.  Baseline solutions  for prices and quantities
mine the short run effects of the policy change on  allocated  to  each  of the  six  markets  were  vali-
the grapefruit  industry.  The  one  year time hori-  dated  against  data  from  the  1990-91  production
zon  represents  a short-run price  and  quantity  so-  year and were found to be fairly accurate.  When
lution  where  some  resources  such  as  grove  size  looking  at  the  baseline  quantities  of grapefruit,
are fixed.  It is unlikely that  a short-run solution  fresh  pink  domestic  grapefruit  dominated  the
will be stable over time (Kohls and Uhl, p.  104).  market  for  fresh  U.S.  grapefruit.  Substantial
Longer time horizons were  not used in this study  quantities for both fresh white and pink grapefruit
because it would require information on too many  are exported.  Of the six markets included  in the
unknowns,  such as whether  a good alternative  to  model,  the  domestic  processed  market  accounts
SOPP  will be  developed  in  the  future.  The per-  for  the  largest  utilization  of Florida  grapefruit.
ennial  nature  of  grapefruit  complicates  under-  The  majority  of Florida  grapefruit  juice  goes to
standing  the  long  run  impacts  of a  postharvest  the  domestic  market  with  a  modest  share  allo-
pesticide ban.6 cated to exports.
Conceptually,  the  cost of postharvest  losses
to the industry is represented by the loss of profits  Table 1. Baseline  Grapefruit Prices, Quantities
to the grapefruit industry.  In this  study,  it is as-  and Total Revenuea
sumed  that changes  in total  revenue  (TR) to the
industry  serve as a good proxy for changes  in  in-  Grapefruit Type  Quantity  Price  Rev Revenue
dustry profits.
The calculations were  done at the wholesale  1,,  4/5  $/aon  bu cartons
level.  Thus the  analysis  assumes  that the  fresh
grapefruit industry is comprised of both grapefruit  Total  27  864,415
Fresh white domestic  2187  6.67  81 producers and packinghouses.  The  demand equa-  Fresh  white export  10,418  10.77  14590 112,205 tions  in  the  spatial  equilibrium  model  are  esti-  Fresh pinkdomestic  20,501  7.26  148,841 are  esti-  Fresh pink domestic  11,765  10.06  148,841
mated for  the wholesale  level.  Changes  in  reve-  Fresh pink export  11,765b  4  118,351
nue were computed for each of the six markets  in  Processed domestic  23 36 b  243c  413,662
the spatial equilibrium  model and summed  to ob-  Processed  export  56,766
tain  the  total  change  in  revenues  for  the  U.S.  Price and quantity in each market were validated against the
1990-91  season  data.
grapefruit  industry.  Total  revenue  changes  as  b Thousands of single  strength  equivalent  (SSE)  gallons  for
quantities  of grapefruit  are  redistributed  among  processed grapefruit.
the  six markets.  A  ban of SOPP would  not  di-  ' Dollars per SSE gallon.  Domestic  price is retail  and proc-
rectly affect production costs at the grove nor the  essed price is  FOB.
costs of picking and hauling the fruit to the pack-
inghouse.  A ban of SOPP would  likely increase  The change in total revenue for the grapefruit
the losses incurred between the packinghouse and  industry for each of the six grapefruit markets  and
the  consumer.  It  is  likely  that  more  grapefruit  three postharvest  loss scenarios is shown in Table
would  spoil  as  it is  moved from  Florida through  2.  For the four fresh grapefruit categories,  prices
terminal markets  and  supermarkets.  By  increas-  increased  and  the quantities  sold  decreased  after
ing the quantity  of fresh  fruit required  to  sell  in  each  loss  scenario.  In  all  three  scenarios,  total
the fresh market, the model is directly accounting  revenue  decreased  for  three  of  the  four  fresh
for the  cost of increased losses  due to spoilage  in  grapefruit  categories  because  the increased  price
the marketing system.  could not compensate  for lost revenue  due  to de-
Table  1 presents  the baseline prices,  quanti-  creased  quantity.  The  exception  was  for  fresh
ties, and total revenue  for the six grapefruit mar-  pink  domestic  grapefruit that  had  an  increase  in
total revenue in all three scenarios.  For the range
of simulated  prices  and  quantities  of fresh  pink
6Florida Agricultural  Statistics  Service records grapefruit  domestic grapefruit, demand  is inelastic.  Thus as
tree production for trees three years old and older with the  the  quantity  of fresh  pink  grapefruit  to  the  do-
oldest category of trees being 24 years old and older.  Gen-  mestic market is reduced, total revenues increase.
erally, as trees age, their annual average yield increases.44  September 1995  Journal  of Food  Distribution  Research
Table 2.  Total Revenue Changes under Different Postharvest Loss Rate Scenarios (in dollars).a
2 Percent  5 Percent  10 Percent
Grapefruit Type  Loss Scenario  Loss Scenario  Loss Scenario
Total  -2,077,050  -5,521,280  -12,119,820
Fresh white domestic  -1,009,610  -2,531,020  -5,105,040
Fresh white export  -798,900  -1,970,170  -4,038,050
Fresh pink domestic  1,382,300  3,529,680  6,208,140
Fresh pink export  -1,576,740  -3,848,310  -7,989,670
Processed domestic  -163,260  -826,480  -1,499,060
Processed export  89,200  125,020  303,860
aThe change in total revenue represents the change in dollars (rounded) between the baseline and the
given loss scenario.
Table 3.  Potential Impacts on Domestic  and Export Total Revenue  (TR) Following a Posthar-
vest Pesticide Ban from Use  on Fresh Grapefruit (in dollars, rounded).
Baseline Total  Change in TR  Change in TR  Change in TR
Revenue  after 2% Loss  after 5% Loss  after 10% Loss
Total  864,415,050  -2,077,050  -5,521,280  -12,119,820
Domestic  577,092,840  209,400  172,170  -395,970
Exports  287,322,210  -2,286,450  -5,693,450  -11,723,850
For both  the  processed  domestic  and  proc-  three loss scenarios,  total revenue from  grapefruit
essed export grapefruit markets,  prices  decreased  exports decreased from the baseline  by 2.3 to  11.7
and quantities sold increased.  Total  revenue (TR)  million  dollars.  Total  revenue  from  domestic
for processed domestic grapefruit decreased while  sales  increased  for the  two and  five  percent  loss
total  revenue  for  processed  exports  increased.  scenarios  and  decreased  by  approximately
This  result can  be  explained  by the fact  that de-  $400,000 for the ten percent loss scenario.
mand  is  elastic  in  the domestic  market  and  ine-  The  change  in total  revenue  for  each of the
lastic in the export market.  four fresh  grapefruit  categories  depended  on  the
The total cost of the postharvest losses to the  relative change  in prices and quantities  sold.  Re-
grapefruit  industry  ranged  from  two  to  twelve  suits  show that  of the four  fresh grapefruit  cate-
million  dollars  depending  on the  loss  scenario.  gories, pink grapefruit  exports were  the most af-
The twelve  million dollar loss represents over  an  fected category in terms of lost total revenue.  For
one percent decrease in total revenue to the grape-  each scenario, there  was also a loss in total reve-
fruit industry suggesting that the grapefruit indus-  nue  for  white  grapefruit  sold  in  both  the  fresh
try  has  a  vested  interest  in  whether  SOPP  is  domestic and export markets.  However,  the pink
banned.  domestic  category  showed  an  increase  in  total
Table 3 presents  the projected impact of the  revenue for all three scenarios.
ban  on total revenue  for the domestic and  export  A  long  run  analysis  is  complicated  by:  (1)
components  of  the  grapefruit  industry.  Those  the  eventual  rate  of pathogen  resistance,  (2)  the
packinghouses  geared  more  toward  exports  are  possibility  of developing  an  alternative  pesticide
more  likely  to be negatively affected  by the  ban  to replace the banned pesticide  in terms of effec-
than those that focus  on domestic  sales.  For the  tiveness and  cost, and  (3)  the perennial  nature  ofBuzby and  Spreen  Impacts on U.S. Grapefruit  Industryfrom Pesticide Banning  45
grapefruit.  The  results  here  could  be  used  as  a  cantly reduced.  Although  the focus  here was on
proxy  for  the  annual  costs  if there  were  three  an  SOPP ban, the results could be applied  to any
main assumptions:  (1)  the increase in postharvest  ban of a postharvest  grapefruit  pesticide that  led
losses  to  the  fresh  grapefruit  industry  was  as-  to two, five, and ten percent postharvest losses to
sumed to reach  a certain level and  then stabilize,  the grapefruit industry.  The model could be used
(2)  if no new  substitute pesticide was developed,  to analyze the impacts of other levels  of posthar-
and  (3)  if production  is assumed to  be constant.  vest losses.
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